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Abstract
I study the intergenerational transmission of collective memory as a
mechanism for cultural transmission, in the presence of social externalities
associated with individual cultural investment decisions (learning and inter-
nalizing cultural norms and values). The younger generation’s investment
decisions are based on beliefs about the quality of existing institutions,
norms and values; these beliefs are influenced by the information (memory)
received from the older generation. I compare the optimal transmission of
collective memory to the young in culturally homogeneous and culturally
heterogeneous societies, and examine how memory transmission is likely to
differ from the social optimum in practice. My findings are consistent with
the empirical evidence on the evolution of collective memory in a variety of
countries.
JEL classification numbers: D82, D83, Z13.
Keywords: memory, identity, cultural transmission, externalities, his-
tory, multi-cultural.
∗I would like to thank Bruno Biais, Larry Blume, Michael Carter, Indraneel Dasgupta, Eti-
enne de Villemeur, Joan Esteban, Ernst Fehr, Mariassunta Giannetti, Alex Gümbel, Denis
Hilton, Karla Hoff, Bruno Jullien, David Laibson, Thomas Mariotti, François Ortalo-Magné,
Elena Panova, Andy Postlewaite, Debraj Ray, Jean-Charles Rochet, Silvia Rossetto, Paul
Seabright, Klaus Schmidt, Jean Tirole, Thierry Verdier, participants at the Toulouse conference
in tribute to Jean-Jacques Laffont, the first ENABLE/Russell Sage symposium on Behavioural
Economics, the Barcelona conference on “Theoretical Perspectives on Identity, Community and
Economic Policy”, and seminar participants in Toulouse for many valuable comments and sug-
gestions.
†IDEI, Université de Toulouse, Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 Allée
de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France (dessi@cict.fr).
1. Introduction
Memory of the past plays a crucial role in the transmission of cultural and na-
tional identity. In every society and every country, the collective or public memory
transmitted to the young by the older generation, through a variety of channels
(e.g. school textbooks, the media, monuments and commemorative rituals), influ-
ences their perception of their cultural identity and values, and their willingness to
invest in them - with major economic as well as political and social consequences.
This naturally raises two questions. First, what would be the socially optimal
transmission of collective memory to the young? Is it the case, as intuition might
suggest, that the older generation should strive to be as unbiased, accurate and
comprehensive as possible in communicating its collective memory to the younger
generation? If not, why and how should it depart from this objective? Second,
is collective memory transmission in practice likely to differ from what would be
socially optimal, and if so how? These questions are at the heart of many current
debates, including those over education policy (e.g. how should history be taught?
how much control should the state have over school textbooks and curriculum?)1,
over the media (e.g. the role of the CPB in the US or the BBC in the UK)2, and
over cultural integration (e.g. centralized versus decentralized institutions in the
European Union, proposed legislation affecting freedom of speech in the UK)3.
The present paper investigates the socially optimal transmission of collective
memory to the young and the biases that are likely to arise in practice, in the
light of the available empirical evidence on collective memory. Building on insights
from the recent literature in economics and psychology, which has highlighted the
potential benefits and costs of selective memory at the individual level4, I exam-
ine the costs and benefits associated with selective collective memory. The first
part of the paper explores a simple intuition. In any society, when individuals
invest in learning and internalizing that society’s cultural norms and values, they
exert significant externalities on other members of society. In very many cases,
these will be positive externalities, as individuals adopt norms of cooperation,
tolerance, fairness, honesty, and so on. Individuals will only be willing to invest
1These questions have attracted considerable interest following the recent controversy over
Japanese history textbooks (on this see, for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
asia-pacific/4416593.stm;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Japanese_history_textbook_controversies).
2See for example Paul Fahri (April 22, 2005), The Washington Post.
3See for example Ben Russell (October 26, 2005), The Independent.
4In the economics literature, Bénabou and Tirole (2002) have analyzed the implications of se-
lective memory for motivation when individuals are time-inconsistent. Compte and Postlewaite
(2004) have shown that when confidence has a positive effect on performance, biases in infor-
mation processing, including selective memory, can enhance individual welfare. Both papers
discuss extensively the related psychology literature.
2
in this way if they are sufficiently confident that the future returns (psychological
as well as practical) will justify incurring current costs. Their investment deci-
sions will therefore depend on their beliefs about the key determinants of these
returns, including the quality of the shared values, norms and institutions, i.e.
the culture, of the society (nation, community) to which they belong. At the time
when the young have to take some of their main investment decisions, their beliefs
are strongly influenced by the information they receive from the older generation
(e.g. at school, through the media)5. This suggests that the selection and presen-
tation of information to the young could be used beneficially to “internalize” the
externalities associated with individual investment decisions.
To investigate this possibility and its implications, I begin by studying the
benchmark case of a culturally homogeneous society. I formalize this by letting an
informed “principal” represent the older generation, and two identical “agents”
represent the younger generation. The principal selects the information to be
transmitted to the agents; each agent, in the light of the information he receives,
will then make an investment decision that exerts an externality on the other
agent. This is the simplest framework I can use to study the benchmark case; it
will be modified and extended in the second part of the paper to allow for cultural
heterogeneity. To examine the socially optimal transmission of memory in this
setting, I assume that the principal chooses the information to be transmitted to
the agents so as to maximize their welfare. When the externality between the
agents is sufficiently large and positive, I find that it can indeed be optimal to
select and present information to the young so as to foster optimism about the
value of the existing culture, thereby inducing greater investments than would be
possible with full and accurate transmission of information.
In practice, this may be achieved in several ways: first, by neglecting to com-
municate information that represents “bad news” about the value of the existing
culture. Second, by presenting and interpreting the information in such a way as
to effectively suppress the underlying bad signal. Third, by emphasizing and fo-
cusing attention on information that represents “good news”, thereby distracting
attention from any bad signal. There is a large body of empirical evidence on
collective memory, discussed in section 4, that provides numerous examples of the
occurrence of all three, in many different situations, and many countries6.
5This is obviously true for children and adolescents, but it is also largely the case for young
adults, since searching individually for information is costly and the value of information is often
very difficult to predict. Thus readily available information, selected and transmitted by the
older generation, tends to be particularly salient and has a substantial impact on beliefs.
6There is clearly an analogy here with some of the ways in which “bad signals” are suppressed
at the individual level. Psychologists have found evidence of self-serving attributions (people
tend to attribute their successes more easily to their ability, their failures to the difficulty of
the task or bad luck). They have also found evidence that individuals examine more carefully
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Whilst the analysis in this first part of the paper identifies a potential benefit
from the selective emphasis, suppression and elaboration of the information trans-
mitted to the young, it also highlights some of the potential costs. First, when the
underlying signal is bad, suppression may give rise to cultural over-optimism and
hence over-investment. One possible interpretation of cultural over-investment is
the tendency to invest so much in learning and internalizing the existing cultural
values of the society that insufficient attention is given to critical questioning, or
comparing and learning from other societies’ cultures. When the underlying signal
is good, the opposite problem may arise: to the extent that the young are aware
of the likely bias towards suppressing bad signals, they will distrust the “posi-
tive” information transmitted by the older generation, and they will be unduly
pessimistic about the value of their culture, leading to under-investment. This
second cost is only present if the young are sufficiently “Bayesian”, as discussed
in section 3, while the first cost can arise even when the young are “naive”.
The results just described were obtained by focusing on the maximization of
the younger generation’s welfare. The analysis can easily be generalized to allow
also for a positive impact of cultural transmission on the well-being of the older
generation: If people derive psychological and practical benefits from successfully
transmitting their values and norms to the young, this creates an additional set of
externalities, increasing the overall social benefits associated with the suppression
of bad signals.
How will collective memory transmission in practice differ from the social opti-
mum? While it is reasonable to assume that the older generation cares at least to
some degree about the well-being of the younger generation, it may not internalize
it fully. In the presence of positive (negative) intra-generational externalities of
the kind discussed above, this would bias the transmission of collective memory
towards too little (too much) suppression of bad signals. Thus we should expect
to observe that collective memory in societies with highly beneficial social norms
and institutions will, if anything, over-emphasize bad signals7, whilst in societies
with socially harmful norms and institutions, it will be excessively selective and
biased towards the suppression of bad signals. This is consistent with the obser-
vation that collective memory is strongly biased towards the suppression of bad
signals and rehearsal of good signals in totalitarian regimes.
These results apply to the benchmark case of culturally homogeneous societies.
The second part of the paper investigates whether and how the insights of the
“negative” information, in order to find flaws in it, or develop alternative explanations (i.e.
explanations that largely suppress the underlying bad signal). For a review and discussion of
this evidence see Dunning (2001).
7The over-emphasis is relative to the social optimum. This can be consistent with some
suppression of bad signals, in the presence of positive and significant social externalities.
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benchmark case need to be modified when we allow for cultural heterogeneity. I
modify the benchmark model to study a society with two distinct communities
(“cultural groups”), each endowed with its own culture. In this case, each indi-
vidual has to make two investment decisions: the first concerns “own-cultural”
investment (learning about and participating in the culture of his own cultural
group); the second concerns “cross-cultural” investment (learning about and par-
ticipating in the culture of the other group). These investments generate two
types of externality: the first is the externality exerted by each individual on
other members of his own cultural group, and the second is the externality ex-
erted by the individual on members of the other cultural group. In order to focus
on the implications of cultural heterogeneity, I consider two symmetric commu-
nities that differ only in terms of their cultural identity, and study, as before, the
transmission of memory by a principal seeking to maximize the welfare of the
younger generation, giving equal weight to each community.
The key new issue that arises in this setting concerns the transmission of
“mixed news” signals; that is, signals that are “bad news” about one culture and
at the same time “good news” about the other. For example, evidence of “bad”
behavior by one group can highlight, by contrast, the “good” behavior, or at any
rate the absence of bad behavior, of another. Similarly, evidence of the achieve-
ments and successes of one group can draw attention to the failures, or simply
the lack of achievements, of another. Should this kind of memory be suppressed?
I find that the costs of suppression outweigh the benefits: with two symmetric
communities, it is always optimal to communicate truthfully “mixed news” sig-
nals. Thus the presence of cultural heterogeneity reduces (although it does not
eliminate) the scope for welfare-enhancing manipulation of the information trans-
mitted to the young. In particular, the only potentially beneficial departure from
truthful communication is associated with the possibility of suppressing memories
that are “bad news” for both cultures, or equivalently emphasizing memories that
are “good news” for both.
How will collective memory transmission differ from the social optimum in
practice? To address this question, I relax the assumption of a social welfare-
maximizing principal and assume that the older generation of each community
seeks to maximize the welfare of its own community. This is an extreme but
convenient simplifying assumption intended to shed light on the possible biases
arising when individuals give more weight to their own community in their prefer-
ences. I find that as long as each community is able to communicate publicly its
information, it will be possible to implement the optimal transmission of “mixed
news” signals. This case essentially corresponds to that of a multi-cultural democ-
racy in which each group provides “checks and balances” that limit the scope for
other groups to transmit their preferred version of the past. When the underlying
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signal is “bad news” for both communities, on the other hand, I find that commu-
nication will be biased towards too little suppression, unless the communities can
implement the social optimum through cooperation to internalize cross-cultural
externalities.
This paper is clearly related to the existing literature on cultural transmission
within economics. The closest work to mine is probably Bisin and Verdier (2000,
2001). They study the transmission of cultural traits which results from the
interaction of two key influences on the preferences of the young: first, the direct
socialization effort of their parents, who wish to transmit their own cultural traits;
second, the effect of the broader social and cultural environment, including friends,
peers, teachers and others who may act as role models. These influences are not
modeled explicitly, however: parents can, at a cost, affect the probability that
their children will inherit their cultural traits; if this parental socialization effort
fails, children acquire the cultural traits of some role model chosen randomly from
the population at large. I view my work as essentially complementary to that of
Bisin and Verdier, since it explores one important way in which parents and society
at large influence the acquisition of cultural traits by the young. Specifically, I
analyze the transmission and manipulation of memory (information about the
past). This in turn influences the cultural investment decisions made by the
young: it is through this channel that it will ultimately affect their preferences,
including their acquisition of cultural traits. While complementary to that of
Bisin and Verdier, this approach allows me to identify a different set of important
externalities, with quite different welfare implications.
Collective memory is an important determinant of identity: in this sense,
the present paper is also related to Akerlof and Kranton (2000), and Bénabou
and Tirole (2005). In common with these papers, I view identity as (partly)
endogenous. My focus is different from theirs, however, as I investigate how
the transmission of collective memory affects cultural investment decisions; these
decisions will then shape identity8.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic version of the
model, which is analyzed in section 3. Section 4 discusses the evidence on collective
memory and relates it to the model. Section 5 extends the model to study the
implications of cultural heterogeneity. Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
This section introduces the simplest version of the model, which will be used to
study the benchmark case in section 3. This basic version of the model will then
8For another related paper which explores the choice between bi-culturalism and mono-
culturalism, see Lazear (1999).
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be extended to allow for cultural heterogeneity in section 5.
The model has three dates, t = 0, 1, 2, and three players, a “principal” P and
two identical “agents”, Ai and Aj.The principal represents the first generation
(“old”), while the agents represent the second generation (“young”): for simplicity,
all players are assumed to be risk-neutral. Information (memory) is transmitted
by the principal to the agents at date 0; given this information, the agents at
date 1 have to make their cultural investment decisions, which may be thought
of as investments in learning and internalizing social norms and values. In what
follows, I shall refer to these equivalently as decisions to “invest in the cooperative
project”, or simply as “effort” decisions. The returns from these investments are
realized at date 2.
The agents’ preferences are described by the following utility function:
Ui = mxi + gmxj − cxi (2.1)
where xi ∈ [0, 1] denotes agent Ai’s investment (effort) decision: if the agent
invests in the cooperative project (exerts effort), xi = 1; if the agent does not
invest (exerts no effort), xi = 0. The variable m represents the value of the
culture passed on from the “old” to the “young” generation, which in my definition
includes institutions, values, norms, and other such cultural assets which affect the
young generation’s ability to succeed in the cooperative project. A higher value
of m increases the returns from both agents’ investments. The constant g may be
positive or negative, depending on whether the society’s cultural values and norms
tend to generate positive or negative externalities. In much of the analysis that
follows, the more interesting case will be the one where g is strictly positive, so that
each agent benefits to some degree from the cooperative investment (effort) of the
other agent. It is this positive externality which will create the potential for some
welfare-enhancing manipulation of information transmission, as will become clear
below. Each agent incurs an effort cost c if he invests in the cooperative project.
This may be interpreted literally as an effort cost (e.g. the effort of learning
and internalizing social norms), but also as an opportunity cost (reflecting the
attractiveness of other options, e.g. leisure, crime, learning and adopting different
cultural values).
To study the socially optimal transmission of memory, I assume that the prin-
cipal fully internalizes the agents’ welfare. Thus his utility is simply equal to the
sum of the agents’ individual utilities:
Up = Ui + Uj = (m+ gm− c)(xi + xj) (2.2)
In reality, although the older generation is likely to care at least to some degree
about the well-being of the younger generation, the transmission of memory will
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also be affected by more self-interested motives: the consequences of these will be
discussed at the end of section 3.
The model’s information structure is as follows. At date 0, the principal re-
ceives a signal s which is informative aboutm (e.g. historical evidence informative
about how good those institutions and norms really are). I will assume that the
principal cannot simply manufacture a good signal (e.g. invent history), but he
can suppress a bad signal, as discussed in the Introduction and more fully in
section 4 below: for example, by providing alternative interpretations, and by
advertising and emphasizing good signals while failing to do the same for bad
signals9. For simplicity, I shall focus on the case where s can take just two values:
s = B (“bad” signal) and s = ∅ (no signal). The expected value of m conditional
on each possible realization of the true signal s is given by:
mL = E[m|s = B] < mH = E[m|s = ∅] (2.3)
The problem for the young is that they do not observe the signal s before they have
to make their effort (investment) decisions: they therefore rely on the information
transmitted by the older generation. At the same time, I will assume that they do
not rely on such information naively, and they are aware of the possibility that the
older generation may manipulate the information it transmits to them in order to
manipulate their beliefs and thereby affect their investment decisions. At the end
of section 3 I will also consider how the results would be affected if we assumed
that the young have naive beliefs.
Let sˆ be the signal transmitted by the principal to the agents. Given our
assumptions, if the true signal is s = ∅, there is no opportunity for signal manip-
ulation; thus sˆ = ∅. On the other hand, if the true signal is s = B, the principal
may either communicate the signal truthfully to the agents (sˆ = B), or he may de-
cide to suppress the bad signal (sˆ = ∅). Given the information transmitted by the
principal at date 0, the agents at date 1 have to make their respective investment
decisions. At this date, and before choosing his effort, each agent learns the cost
of effort, c. I assume that this is not known at date 0, to allow for possible technol-
ogy, political and institutional shocks and their impact on the effort/opportunity
cost of investing in learning and internalizing the society’s cultural norms. At
date 0, the effort cost c is known to have a continuous distribution F (c) over the
interval [cL, cH ], with density f(c) > 0. To make the analysis interesting, I will
9The assumption that the principal can suppress a bad signal but cannot invent a good
signal is motivated by the historical literature on collective memory and nationalism: for ex-
ample, McBride (2001) notes that “While nationalist mobilisation sometimes involves outright
fabrication, it more often requires the imaginative reworking of pre-existing materials”. The
qualitative results in this paper would continue to hold if we allowed for the possibility of out-
right fabrication.
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make the following assumption:
cL < mL < mH < cH (2.4)
implying that, regardless of the information transmitted by the principal, there
is a strictly positive ex-ante probability that the agents will exert effort ex post,
and a strictly positive ex-ante probability that they will not. Finally, I assume,
for simplicity, that the value of g is public information.
3. Memory transmission in a culturally homogeneous soci-
ety
This section examines the implications of the benchmark case outlined and mo-
tivated in section 2, with a single principal representing the older generation and
two identical agents representing the younger generation. Consider to begin with
the agents’ decisions at date 1, in the light of the information then available to
them. Each agent has to form expectations over the returns from investment,
hence over m. In doing so, the agents will take into account the possibility that
the signal transmitted by the principal may be manipulated, relative to the true
signal s. Let the agents’ prior beliefs concerning the true signal be described by the
probability q; that is, the agents believe that s = ∅ with probability q and s = B
with probability 1−q (these “uninformed” beliefs will be based on whatever infor-
mation is readily apparent to everyone, including the young). When they receive
the principal’s signal, sˆ, the agents have to assess its reliability, based on their
beliefs concerning the true signal and their beliefs concerning the communication
strategy (truthful or otherwise) used by the principal. Given our assumptions,
the principal’s communication strategy can be described by the probability h that
he will truthfully communicate the bad signal:
h = Pr[sˆ = B|s = B] (3.1)
The agents’ beliefs concerning the principal’s communication strategy will be
denoted by h∗: thus a high value of h∗ corresponds to a high level of “trust”
between the older and the younger generation, and conversely a low value of h∗
implies that the young give a relatively low weight to the information transmitted
by the older generation in forming their beliefs. In the limit, when h∗ = 0, the
young regard the signal transmitted by the old as completely uninformative.
I will assume that the agents update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule,
which captures the idea that the young cannot simply be fooled into believing
anything the older generation wishes them to believe (the implications of naive
beliefs are considered at the end of the section). Thus if the principal transmits
9
the signal sˆ = ∅, the agents estimate the following probability that the signal is
accurate (the signal’s “reliability”):
r∗ = Pr[s = ∅|sˆ = ∅;h∗] = q
q + (1− q)(1− h∗) (3.2)
implying that their expected value of m is given by:
m(r∗) = r∗mH + (1− r∗)mL (3.3)
When will the agents provide effort? Given the principal’s signal sˆ, each agent
will provide effort (invest in the cooperative project) if, and only if:
E[m|sˆ] > c (3.4)
We can immediately see that the principal may have an incentive to manipulate
the information he communicates to the agents by considering his expected utility




2{(1 + g)E[m|s]− c}dF (c) (3.5)
If the principal could simply choose the agents’ beliefs, he would clearly set them
equal to:
E[m|sˆ] = (1 + g)E[m|s] (3.6)
Thus as long as g > 0, the principal would like the agents to be optimistic
about the value of the existing norms and institutions; that is, to form higher
expectations than they would if they could observe the true signal s. The reason
is of course that when g > 0, each agent’s decision to invest in the cooperative
project exerts a positive externality on the other agent, but neither agent takes
this into account when choosing his effort. If the agents are accurately informed
about the true signal, the result is an under-provision of effort relative to the social
optimum. By manipulating the agents’ beliefs and increasing their confidence in
the value of their culture, the principal could correct this under-investment.
Obviously the principal cannot simply choose the agents’ beliefs. We must
therefore examine the relationship between the principal’s communication strat-
egy, h, and the agents’ beliefs and investment decisions.
3.1. What to do with bad signals: disclose or suppress?
Suppose the principal observes the “bad” signal (s = B) at date 0. If he transmits





2{(1 + g)mL − c}dF (c) (3.7)
where the subscript T stands for “telling the truth”. If on the other hand the
principal suppresses the bad signal (sˆ = ∅), his expected utility depends on the





2{(1 + g)mL − c}dF (c) (3.8)
where the subscript S stands for “suppression”. The net gain from suppressing
the bad signal is therefore equal to:
SWS(mL, r
∗)− SWT (mL) =
Z m(r∗)
mL
2{(1 + g)mL − c}dF (c) (3.9)
If m(r∗) > (1 + g)mL, the net gain can be written as follows:
Z (1+g)mL
mL
2{(1 + g)mL − c}dF (c)−
Z m(r∗)
(1+g)mL
2{c− (1 + g)mL}dF (c) (3.10)
The first integral represents the gains from suppressing the bad signal: by
inducing greater optimism about the value of the existing norms and institutions,
and hence about the returns from investment, suppressing the bad signal elicits
more effort and thereby corrects the under-provision of effort due to the presence
of externalities between the agents. However, optimism can go too far: the second
integral represents the loss from excessive optimism, which leads agents to invest
too much.
The net gain from suppressing the bad signal is clearly increasing in g, the
magnitude of the externalities between the two agents, and decreasing in r∗, the
agents’ beliefs about the reliability of the principal’s signal. Thus when the agents’
“trust” is high (high value of r∗), the principal’s net gain from suppressing the
bad signal tends to be lower, because there is a greater danger of excessive opti-
mism: this suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria with different degrees of
trust. On the other hand, for sufficiently high values of g (sufficiently important
externalities), the net gain from manipulating information will always be strictly
positive, irrespective of the agents’ beliefs: in this case “high trust” equilibria
cannot be sustained. The intuition just outlined is confirmed by Proposition 1
below, which characterizes the set of Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs)10.
10Details of the principal’s optimization problem, as well as the definition of PBE, are relegated
to Appendix 2 for ease of exposition.
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Proposition 1 There exist gH and gL, with gH > gL > 0, such that:
(i) For all g > gH , there is a unique PBE with h∗ = 0;
(ii) For all g < gL, there is a unique PBE with h∗ = 1;
(iii) For all g ∈ [gL, gH ], there are three PBEs: (a) h∗ = 0, (b) h∗ = 1, and
(c) h∗ = h(g), where h(g) increases from 0 to 1 as g increases from gL to gH .
Proof : see Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 confirms our intuition concerning the possibility of multiple equi-
libria: for intermediate values of g, both “high-trust” (h∗ = 1) and “low-trust”
(h∗ = 0) equilibria are feasible, as well as equilibria with an intermediate degree
of trust. For high values of g, on the other hand, only low-trust equilibria are
feasible: when the externalities between the two agents are sufficiently important,
the only credible strategy for the principal is to suppress the bad signal. For suf-
ficiently low values of g, the opposite is true: the loss from over-investment would
exceed any gain from the correction of under-investment; thus the principal’s op-
timal strategy is always to tell the truth, and the only equilibria are high-trust
equilibria.
3.2. Interpretation and extensions
The results so far have a number of interesting implications for the transmission
of collective memory. First, we have shown that if the older generation seeks to
maximize the welfare of the younger generation, it will choose to suppress bad
signals when the positive externalities generated by individual decisions to invest
in the cooperative project are sufficiently important. Thus “telling the whole
truth” is not always an optimal strategy: in some cases it is better to manipulate
the information transmitted to the young in order to foster optimism about the
value of existing cultural norms and institutions and hence about the returns from
cultural investment. This leads to a higher provision of effort than would be the
case with truthful information transmission, thereby counteracting the tendency
for individuals to under-invest because they do not take into account the positive
externalities their investment exerts on others.
A number of other implications of the analysis are discussed below together
with possible extensions.
3.2.1. Intergenerational externalities and self-interested motives
The results described by Proposition 1 have been obtained under the assump-
tion that the older generation is only concerned with maximizing the younger
generation’s welfare. It is straightforward to extend the analysis to allow for a
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direct impact on the older generation’s welfare (as opposed to the indirect im-
pact due to the fact that the older generation will, at least to some degree, care
for the well-being of the younger generation). The younger generation’s invest-
ment in the cooperative project will typically imply some costs (time, effort and
resources) for the older generation; at the same time, the older generation will
reap some benefits from these investments. For example, the older generation
may obtain psychological benefits from transmitting its values and norms to the
young, as well as practical benefits from easier coordination, communication and
comprehension. The net direct benefits to the older generation therefore rep-
resent an important additional, intergenerational externality, with qualitatively
similar implications to those associated with the intragenerational externalities
examined earlier. Specifically, if the net direct benefits to the older generation
are strictly positive (negative), the net gains from suppressing bad signals will be
correspondingly higher (lower).
In reality, as noted in the Introduction, the older generation may not fully
internalize the younger generation’s welfare. In the presence of positive (negative)
intragenerational externalities, this will bias memory transmission towards too
little (too much) suppression of bad signals.
3.2.2. Trust
Another implication of the results summarized in Proposition 1 is that low-trust
equilibria may be better than high-trust equilibria in terms of welfare. For in-
termediate values of g, there exist multiple equilibria, with low-trust equilibria
which are strictly better in terms of social welfare than the corresponding high-
trust equilibria (i.e. holding the value of g constant). Thus a high degree of
scepticism on the part of the young concerning the reliability of the information
transmitted by the older generation need not mean that the society is trapped in
a “bad” (low social welfare) equilibrium.
However, this can only be the case if the information available to the older
generation represents a “bad” signal (s = B), as assumed in this section so far.
The implications of a high or low level of trust are of course very different when the
information available to the older generation represents a “good” signal (s = ∅).
In this case, it is easy to verify that, for any given value of g, social welfare when
trust is high (h∗ = 1) is strictly higher than social welfare when trust is low
(h∗ = 0). Distrust is costly in this case because it means that the young give no
weight to the (truthful) good signal, and as a consequence invest too little: I shall
refer to this situation as one of “cultural pessimism”.
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3.2.3. The costs of suppression
The results of this section illustrate both the potential benefits and the potential
costs associated with the possibility of suppressing bad signals. On the one hand,
this may be beneficial for society, to the extent that it corrects the tendency to
under-invest in the presence of positive and substantial social externalities. On
the other hand, it may be detrimental for society, in two different ways: first,
when the underlying signal is indeed bad, suppression can lead to cultural over-
optimism and over-investment. Second, when the underlying signal is in fact good,
distrust of the older generation can give rise to cultural pessimism and exacerbate
the under-investment problem.
3.2.4. Naive beliefs
So far I have assumed that the younger generation is not naive: it realizes that
the older generation may not always tell the truth. This seems a reasonable
assumption for adolescents and young adults. On the other hand, it may be argued
that the assumption is less compelling for children; moreover, a substantial part
of an individual’s investment in learning and internalizing cultural values occurs
during childhood. It is therefore important to examine how the results obtained
above are modified if we assume that the younger generation simply believes the
information it receives from the older generation. We have the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose the agents always believe the principal is telling the
truth. Then:
(i) For all g > gH , the principal will suppress the bad signal ( h = 0);
(ii) For all g 6 gH , the principal will tell the truth (h = 1).
Proof : see Appendix 1.
Thus with naive beliefs, the principal will still suppress bad signals when so-
cial externalities are sufficiently large. However, the assumption of naive beliefs
eliminates the multiplicity of equilibria for intermediate values of g (between gL
and gH): in this range, the net gain from suppressing bad signals would be neg-
ative because the agents are so trusting that they would become too optimistic
and invest too much. Thus the principal’s optimal strategy is to tell the truth.
Truthful communication is of course the optimal strategy also for lower values of
g.
Overall, naive beliefs modify our earlier results in two important ways. First,
they remove the multiplicity of equilibria for intermediate values of the externality
parameter g and ensure that truthful communication of bad signals will occur in
this range. Second, they remove the costs of distrust and cultural pessimism when
the underlying signal is good.
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4. Collective memory: how societies remember, and forget
“All memories are “created” in tandem with forgetting; to remember everything
would amount to being overwhelmed by memory. Forgetting is a necessary com-
ponent in the construction of memory. Yet the forgetting of the past in a culture
is often highly organized and strategic” (Sturken 1997, p.7).
There is a large and growing literature on collective memory11, based on re-
search by historians, sociologists and psychologists, that studies the ways in which
societies remember, represent and interpret the past. This literature explores the
role of school textbooks, newspaper articles, television and radio programs, film,
monuments, museums, commemorative rituals, plays, novels, and so on: In other
words, the sources that are most likely to impact on the beliefs of the young. Of
particular interest from the perspective of the present paper is the wealth of de-
tailed case studies documenting the relationship between collective memory and
national identity, for many different countries. These studies provide plenty of
evidence that collective memory tends to suppress bad signals. As noted earlier,
this occurs in several ways: first, “negative” information is sometimes neglected,
ignored and forgotten. Second, it is sometimes presented and interpreted in such
a way as to effectively suppress the bad signal. Third, attention is distracted
from bad signals by emphasis and elaboration of “positive” information. Given
space constraints, it would be impossible for me to summarize all the relevant
evidence and examples. I shall therefore discuss a few examples to illustrate the
main mechanisms at work, and make it clear that the evidence is not limited to
particular time periods, countries, or events; abundant additional evidence can be
found in the cited sources.
Suppressing bad signals: national origins, values and identity
Nations often construct and transmit to the young representations of the past
intended to provide an attractive account of the nation’s cultural values and iden-
tity. These are sometimes referred to as “myths”, although not in the sense of
being either entirely fictional or irrational. “Myth” in this context should be un-
derstood as “a set of beliefs, usually put forth as a narrative, held by a community
about itself” (Schöpflin (1997), p.19). Notice that this definition does not carry
11See Olick and Robbins (1998) for a survey, as well as McBride (2001) and Zerubavel (1995)
for excellent discussions. Some authors prefer to use the term “social memory” (e.g. Fentress
and Wickham (1992)) or “cultural memory” (e.g. Sturken (1997)). The notion that collective
memory is to a large extent shaped by, and suited to, current needs and interests, can be traced
back to the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1925). See also, among others, Buruma (1994);
Darian-Smith and Hamilton (1994); Edwards and Middleton (1990); Fabre and O’Meally (1994);
Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983); Kammen (1978); Maier (1988); Müller (2002); Olick and Levy
(1997); Schwartz (1998); Thelen (1989) and Trouillot (1995), as well as the works cited in the
remainder of this section.
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any implication of falsehood or invention, and is consistent with the formalization
in terms of signal transmission used in this paper. In practice, these “myths”,
while generally based on historical truth, typically neglect negative information
and emphasize positive information. American “myths” of origins, for example,
were built around the arrival of the Pilgrim Fathers, the opening of the West, the
American Revolution and the Civil War12. In each case, the narrative empha-
sized those aspects that confirmed and reinforced the cultural values that were
intended to be transmitted to the young: religious freedom, freedom of expression,
progress, self-reliant individualism, democratic equality13. Aspects that were less
in tune with these values were largely neglected and suppressed14.
National “myths”, in the sense defined above, have played a very important
role in cultural transmission in many countries15. In France, for example, the
French Revolution provided fertile ground for myth-building16, intended to con-
firm and reinforce the country’s “republican values”. Indeed, in 1882 Ernest Re-
nan argued that “the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in
common, and also that they have forgotten many things”, and made it clear that
the object of forgetfulness should be bad signals, in the sense of the present paper:
“Every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew,
or the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century”17.
Suppressing bad signals: collective memories of the Second World War
Is the tendency for collective memory to suppress bad signals limited to myths
of national origins and distant historical events? To answer this question, it is
interesting to consider the evidence on a major, relatively recent event that had
a profound impact on very many countries: World War II. We find, first, consid-
erable variation among countries. Second, there is a clear tendency for collective
12For suggestive evidence of the impact of such “myths” on the younger generation (in par-
ticular, a sample of over 1000 college students), see Frisch (1989).
13See, among others, Grant (1997), Hellmann (1986), Kammen (1991), Schwartz (1991).
14Thus the myth of the Fathers emphasized the role of English Pilgrims fleeing persecution
while ignoring the many who arrived in America for quite different reasons, and downplaying
the violence of American colonial society (Grant (1997)). The myth of the West was intimately
bound up with the development of the American understanding of democracy (see Schwartz
(1991)) and required significant amnesia over aspects of the relationship with Native Americans
(see Boime (1998) and Kammen (1991)) and with Mexico (Boime (1998); Kammen (1991)).
The myth of the American Revolution (as with many other countries’ wars of independence)
overstated the degree of consensus prevailing at the time, and largely forgot the fate and number
of loyalists (Grant (1997); Kammen (1991)). The suppression of bad signals involved in the
construction of the Civil War myth is discussed in detail in Grant (1997).
15For a wealth of other examples of national myths, see Eley and Suny (1996), Hosking and
Schöpflin (1997) and Samuel (1998).
16See Nora ((1992) [1996]) for this and other examples of French myths.
17Renan ((1996) [1882], p.45).
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memory to emphasize positive information (e.g. acts of courage, resistance against
the enemy, liberation of the oppressed - and of course negative information about
other countries, when this provides a favorable comparison) and neglect negative
information (e.g. acts of cowardice and betrayal, collaboration with the enemy,
massacres, extermination)18. This evidence is again consistent with the analysis
in the present paper.
Moreover, many countries experienced a change of political regime as a result
of the war, often associated with a radical change in values and norms. Affir-
mation of these new values required rejection of the old values, and disclosure of
“bad signals” about the culture of the old, rejected regime. By highlighting the
contrast with the new values, such disclosure effectively sheds a favorable light
on the new political culture. In terms of the analysis developed in section 3, this
represents another way of fostering optimism about the current (new) culture and
encouraging the young to invest in it. The evolution of collective memory in,
for example, the former West Germany and the former East Germany is broadly
consistent with this analysis19. The reality of such a process is of course far more
complex than can be captured by any stylized model; in particular, people cannot
simply switch their values following a change of political regime. The process of
change can be started under the leadership of that part of the older generation
that had opposed the values of the old regime, but it will often require the col-
laboration of many who did not. Thus full disclosure of “bad signals” about the
old regime can take some time20.
The evolution of collective memory
The example of countries that experience a radical change of political regime
and associated values can be thought of as an extreme case of the more general
tendency for collective memory to evolve in line with cultural values, uncovering
memories that no longer represent a bad signal, and suppressing memories that
now do represent a bad signal, as would be predicted by the analysis in this paper.
Again, there is abundant evidence to support this implication. A good example is
provided by the evolution of American collective memory of George Washington
before and after the Civil War, analyzed in detail by Schwartz (1991). This study
shows how collective memory of Washington in the period between his death and
the Civil War emphasized his refinement and gentility, his self-restraint and as-
ceticism, his dignity and remoteness - in short, “an aristocratic ideal - an ideal
18See, among others, Boime (1998); Conrad (2003); Hilton and Liu (2005); Judt (1992);
Rousso (1991); Shimazu (2003); von Borries (2003).
19See von Borries (2003).
20This was the case not only in Germany (see von Borries (2003)), but also in France over
Vichy (Rousso (1991)). The French pattern was one of trauma and purges in the immediate
aftermath of Vichy, followed by memory suppression and emphasis on the Resistance, followed
by full disclosure of the “bad signals” associated with the Vichy regime.
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more suited to the gentleman than to the common man, to an eighteenth-century
republic than a modern democracy”. In the aftermath of the Civil War, Wash-
ington’s popularity declined and more critical accounts emerged; his aristocratic
background became an embarrassment for his democratic supporters. This phase
was followed by the construction of a new, more democratic memory of Wash-
ington, involving the rediscovery of many of his forgotten traits - his “adeptness
at frontier living, his experience at common labor and attachment to the com-
mon people, his kindness to children, his strong romantic inclinations” and other
“traits that Americans had always associated with democracy”. Moreover, the
new memory of Washington emphasized that he would have liked to abolish slav-
ery, and was always kind to his slaves. The new memory complemented and
democratized the old, making “Washington all the more appealing”.
5. Memory transmission in a multi-cultural society
The benchmark analysis developed in section 3 assumed a culturally homogeneous
society. It is therefore of considerable interest to extend the model and investigate
which insights continue to hold and which need to be modified, and how, once we
allow for a multi-cultural society.
5.1. The model: modifications
To focus on the implications of cultural heterogeneity, I retain the basic structure
of the model of section 2 but relax the assumption of homogeneity. The two
agents, Ai and Aj, are no longer assumed to be identical: each agent belongs to a
different community or “cultural group” (has a different “cultural identity”). The
agents’ preferences are described by the following utility function:
Ui = mixii + bmjxij + gmixji − c(xii + xij) (5.1)
where mi and mj represent the norms, values and institutions of the two cultural
groups, respectively. Each agent now has to take two decisions: how much to
invest in his own culture (that of his cultural group), and how much to invest
in the other culture. For agent Ai (agent Aj), denote by xii (xjj) the effort he
devotes to learning about and participating in his own culture, and by xij (xji)
the effort he devotes to learning about and participating in the other culture. The
net benefits from investing in a given culture will depend partly on that culture’s
norms, values and institutions (as in sections 2 and 3), and partly on the cultural
identity of the agent who invests. Thus if agent Ai invests in culture j, he may
face higher costs and/or reap lower benefits than if agent Aj makes an equivalent
investment: for example, because agent Aj’s parents belong to cultural group j,
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and can more easily communicate knowledge of their own culture to their child
(thereby reducing the agent’s learning costs), and because agent Aj has greater
opportunities to interact with members of cultural group j (which reduces his
learning costs and increases his benefits from investing in culture j).
This possible difference is captured by the parameter b > 0: if b < 1, there
is a comparative disadvantage in investing in a culture other than one’s own; the
disadvantage disappears for b = 1. Clearly the value of b can be affected by a
variety of policies; in what follows I assume that b is given exogenously, in order
to focus on the transmission of memory given b. Similarly the effort (opportunity)
cost c is assumed to be given exogenously. Moreover, I assume that ex ante the
cost is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1] for both agents (i.e. both
cultural groups), in order to have as much symmetry as possible between the two
agents (groups). This will provide a clear benchmark analysis, and allow me to
focus on the implications of asymmetric signals in an otherwise symmetric setting,
as discussed below. Finally, the parameter g now captures the externality exerted
by each agent on the other when it invests in the other’s culture. To make the
analysis interesting, I assume that this externality is positive.
To investigate the welfare-maximizing transmission of memory in the presence
of cultural heterogeneity, I shall assume that the principal gives equal weight to
each cultural group. His utility will be given by the following expression:
Up = Ui + Uj + Vmixii + Vmjxjj (5.2)
The principal therefore maximizes the sum of the two agents’ utilities, plus two
terms reflecting the fact that each agent’s decision to invest in his own culture
exerts an externality, represented by V , on other members of his cultural group.
This is a convenient way of allowing for the intra-group externalities that were
studied in section 3 without explicitly modeling the interaction of agents within
the same cultural group as well as across cultural groups. I focus on the more
interesting case where these externalities are positive.
The information structure of the model is modified as follows. P (the principal)
now receives a two-dimensional signal, s = [si, sj], where si is informative about
the value of mi and sj is informative about the value of mj. I allow for the
possibility of “bad news”, “no news” and “good news”; thus sk ∈ [∅, B,G] (k =
i, j). The expected value of mk (k = i, j), conditional on each possible realization
of sk, is given by:
mL = E[mk|sk = B] < mM = E[mk|sk = ∅] < mH = E[mk|sk = G] (5.3)
where 0 < mL < mH < 1. I assume that “good news” and “bad news” are
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symmetric relative to “no news”, in the sense that mL and mH are equidistant
from mM :
mL + z = mM = mH − z (5.4)
for some z > 0.
As noted in the Introduction, the key new issue that arises in this context
concerns the principal’s communication strategy in the presence of “mixed news”:
that is, a signal which is good news about one culture but simultaneously bad
news about the other. To investigate the issue of mixed news, I shall focus on the
case where s can take just four possible values: s ∈ {[∅, ∅] , [B,B] , [B,G] , [G,B]}.
Thus the principal may receive no signal about either mi or mj; he may receive a
bad signal about both, or he may receive a signal which is bad for one and good for
the other. This is the simplest framework I can use to study the issues of interest.
I continue to assume that the principal cannot simply manufacture a signal; on
the other hand he can suppress a signal. Thus if the true value of s is [∅, ∅] , the
principal has no scope for manipulating the information he transmits to the agents:
sˆ = [∅, ∅]. However, if the principal receives a signal s ∈ {[B,B] , [B,G] , [G,B]},
he can either communicate the signal truthfully to the agents, or suppress it (in
the latter case, sˆ = [∅, ∅]).
The principal’s communication strategy therefore consists of three probabili-
ties, hBB, hGB and hBG, defined by:
hBB = Pr {sˆ = [B,B] |s = [B,B]} (5.5)
hBG = Pr {sˆ = [B,G] |s = [B,G]} (5.6)
hGB = Pr {sˆ = [G,B] |s = [G,B]} (5.7)
As for beliefs, I assume full symmetry between the agents ex ante (again, as a
benchmark); that is, they share the same “uninformed” beliefs before they receive
the principal’s signal21.
5.2. Multi-cultural societies: mixed-news signals
Suppose the principal receives a mixed-news signal; for example, s = [G,B]. If he
communicates the signal truthfully to the agents, his expected utility is equal to:
SWT (mH ,mL) =
Z mH
0
[mH(1 + V )− c] dc+
Z mL
0
[mL(1 + V )− c] dc




[(b+ g)mL − c] dc+
Z bmH
0
[(b+ g)mH − c] dc (5.8)
If the principal suppresses the true signal, his expected utility is given instead




[mH(1 + V )− c] dc+
Z mj(r∗)
0




[(b+ g)mL − c] dc+
Z bmi(r∗)
0
[(b+ g)mH − c] dc (5.9)
Thus the net gain from suppressing the mixed-news signal is equal to:




[mH(1 + V )− c] dc+
Z mj(r∗)
mL




[(b+ g)mL − c] dc−
Z bmH
bmi(r∗)
[(b+ g)mH − c] dc (5.10)
The first integral in expression (5.10) represents the effect on agent Ai’s de-
cision to invest in his own culture: suppressing the true signal, which was “good
news” about the value ofmi, reduces Ai’s incentives to invest, leading to an under-
provision of effort. This term therefore represents a net loss from the suppression
of the true signal. The second integral shows the effect on agent Aj’s decision
to invest in his own culture: suppressing the true signal, which was “bad news”
about mj, increases his incentives to invest, which mitigates the under-provision
of effort due to the presence of positive externalities (V > 0) among members
of Aj’s cultural group. However, if mj(r∗) > (1 + V )mL, there will be an over-
provision of effort. The net gain from this second effect is therefore analogous to
the one examined earlier, in section 3, and is increasing in V , the magnitude of
the intra-group externalities.
There are two additional “cross-cultural” effects. The last two terms of expres-
sion (5.10) show the effect on each agent’s decision to invest in the other agent’s
culture. Suppressing the true signal increases Ai’s cross-cultural investment and
reduces Aj’s cross-cultural investment. If we assume that bmj(r∗) > (b + g)mL,




[(b+ g)mL − c] dc−
Z bmj(r∗)
(b+g)mL




[(b+ g)mH − c] dc (5.11)
This makes clear the different effects at work. The first integral represents the
gain from agent Ai’s greater optimism about the other culture, which corrects
the tendency to under-invest due to the presence of positive cross-cultural ex-
ternalities. The second integral represents the loss from Ai’s excessive optimism
about the other culture, which leads him to over-invest. Finally, the last integral
represents the loss from agent Aj’s under-investment in the other culture.
The principal’s optimal communication strategy turns out to be very simple:
Proposition 3 Suppose the principal receives the signal s = [G,B]. Then
he will always communicate the signal truthfully to the agents : sˆ = [G,B] (i.e.
hGB = 1).
Proof : see Appendix 1.
Given the symmetry of the problem, the same obviously applies when the
principal receives the signal s = [B,G]: in this case, sˆ = [B,G]. Thus the
principal’s optimal communication strategy when he receives a “mixed news”
signal is to transmit the signal truthfully to the agents. It follows that the only
circumstances in which there is a potential for beneficial manipulation of the
information transmitted to the agents are those corresponding to receipt of a
signal which is “bad news” for both cultures, i.e. s = [B,B]. In this case, as in
the mono-cultural case analyzed in section 3, suppression of the true signal can be
welfare-enhancing, provided social externalities (within each cultural group and
between cultural groups) are sufficiently important.
5.3. Interpretation and extensions
The intuition for the result summarized in Proposition 3 is that the productivity
of investment is higher for the culture with the higher value of m; thus under-
investment in that culture is more costly in terms of social welfare than under-
investment in the other culture. Accurate public transmission of the true signal
s is therefore needed to provide efficient investment incentives to both agents.
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5.3.1. Multi-cultural versus mono-cultural societies
An important implication of this result is that cultural heterogeneity reduces the
scope for welfare-enhancing manipulation of memory, in the following sense: a
bad signal for one community’s culture, which might have been worth suppressing
from the perspective of that community, is no longer worth suppressing if it also
represents a good signal for the other community’s culture. In equilibrium, less
manipulation enhances the credibility of “good news”, which can benefit both
communities.
The analysis in this section shows how the insights developed in section 3 need
to be modified to take account of the implications of cultural heterogeneity. On
the one hand, the insights of section 3 continue to apply, as might be expected,
in the presence of signals that are either good news about both cultures, or bad
news about both cultures. On the other hand, there are circumstances (“mixed
news”) in which it cannot be optimal any longer to manipulate memory.
5.3.2. Memory transmission in practice
So far we have focused on the optimal transmission of memory in the presence of
cultural heterogeneity. How will collective memory transmission differ from the
social optimum in practice? Clearly if the older generation of each community
seeks to maximize social welfare, the outcome will be the same as with the welfare-
maximizing principal assumed above. Suppose instead that the older generation
of each community is only concerned with maximizing the welfare of its own
community. This is of course an extreme but convenient simplifying assumption
to investigate the biases that are likely to arise when individuals give a higher
weight in their preferences to their own community. Consider the case of a multi-
cultural democracy, in which the older generation of each community receives the
true signal s and has the opportunity to communicate the signal publicly.
There are two possibilities of interest. First, the true signal is “bad news” for
both cultures (i.e. s = [B,B]). In this case, the outcome of any Nash equilibrium
of the communication game will be biased towards too little suppression of the
signal, relative to the social optimum. This is because of the presence of positive
cross-cultural externalities (g > 0). The second possibility of interest is that of
“mixed news”. In this case, truthful communication is the (unique) equilibrium
outcome of the communication game. The reason is that telling the truth is a
dominant strategy for the community whose “own” signal is “good news”. In this
case, therefore, it is possible to implement the social optimum.
23
6. Conclusions
This paper studies the intergenerational transmission of knowledge about the past,
focusing on its implications for cultural transmission and cultural investments by
the young. It shows that some manipulation of the information transmitted to
the young (the suppression of bad signals) may at times be beneficial, by fos-
tering optimism about the value of existing cultural norms and institutions and
thereby encouraging investments which generate important social externalities.
This can be seen as providing a rationale for certain biases documented by so-
ciologists, psychologists and historians working on collective memory. However,
manipulative strategies also have important costs: they may generate cultural
over-optimism and over-investment in some cases, and the reverse, cultural pes-
simism and under-investment, in other cases. Moreover, the scope for beneficial
manipulation of information by the older generation is significantly reduced, al-
though not eliminated, in multi-cultural societies, where the truthful disclosure of
“mixed-news” signals is needed to provide efficient own-cultural and cross-cultural
investment incentives.
These findings begin to address some of the policy issues raised in the Intro-
duction. For example, how should history be taught in schools? We have seen that
in some circumstances there may be a case for the selective emphasis of good sig-
nals and suppression of bad signals; on the other hand, the suppression of “mixed
news” signals is never optimal. In practice, many of the signals that one group or
another might like to suppress can be interpreted as “mixed news” in an increas-
ingly multi-cultural context (as evidenced for example in the recent controversy
over Japanese history textbooks). The scope for welfare-enhancing suppression of
information is correspondingly limited. This can raise difficult issues of balance,
given that some selection is always necessary.
The problem of balance is also very relevant to the debate on public service
broadcasting. The analysis in this paper suggests an important role for public ser-
vice broadcasting in granting opportunities for public communication to different
cultural groups. From this perspective, “balance” requirements22 may be valuable
as a commitment device to avoid the perception (and/or reality) of costly biases.
At the same time, their implementation can raise difficulties, as noted above with
regard to classroom teaching and textbooks, because of the need for selection.
Much work remains to be done on these and other related issues. It would be
interesting to extend the analysis of this paper in a number of ways. From both
a theoretical and a policy perspective, it would be useful to consider asymmetric
cultural groups. Another important avenue for further research would be the
dynamics of memory transmission and cultural investments. Yet another issue
22As in the case of the CPB, for example.
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that clearly deserves attention is the relationship between memory and conflict.
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8. Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1




[SWS(mL, r)− SWT (mL)] =
Z m(r)
mL
{(1 + g)mL − c}dF (c) (8.1)
Lemma 1. For all r ∈ [q, 1], there exists a unique G(r) > 0 such that
B(r,G(r)) = 0 and:




and G(r) is strictly increasing in r.
Proof of Lemma 1. For any given r, it is clear from (8.1) that B(r, g) > 0
for g > r(mH −mL)
mL






mLdF (c) > 0 (8.2)
This establishes that there is a unique value G(r) such that B(r,G(r)) = 0, and
that 0 < G(r) <
r(mH −mL)
mL
. Moreover, it establishes part (i) of Lemma 1. It
remains to establish that G0(r) > 0. We have:
∂B(r, g)
∂r
= (mH −mL)[(1 + g)mL −m(r)]f(m(r)) (8.3)








< 0. Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, G0(r) >
0. ¤
To prove Proposition 1 using Lemma 1, note that:
(i) for all g > G(1) we have, for all r ∈ [q, 1], G(r) < g, and therefore B(r, g) >
0. Thus the principal’s optimal strategy is h = 0;
(ii) for all g < G(q) we have, for all r ∈ [q, 1], G(r) > g, and therefore
B(r, g) < 0. Thus the principal’s optimal strategy is h = 1;
(iii) for G(q) 6 g 6 G(1), there exists by the lemma a unique inverse function
R(g) ≡ G−1(g), such that B(R(g), g) = 0. Moreover, the function R is increasing,
and for any r ∈ [q, 1], B(r, g) has the sign of R(g)− r. This implies that the only
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equilibrium with r > R(g) is r = 1 (h = 1), with B(1, g) < 0; the only equilibrium
with r < R(g) is r = q (h = 0), with B(q, g) > 0; and finally r = R(g) is an
equilibrium, with h = h(g) ≡
1− q
R(g)
1− q , and B(R(g), g) = 0.
To complete the proof, define gH ≡ G(1) and gL ≡ G(q). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2
From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that when the agents believe that
the principal always tells the truth (i.e. r∗ = 1), the principal’s optimal strategy
is:
(i) for all g > gH , h = 0;
(ii) for all g < gL, h = 1;
(iii) for gL 6 g 6 gH , h = 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3
For all r ∈ [qN , 1] , rBB ∈ [0,
qB
qN + qB
], rBG ∈ [0,
qM
qN + qM




V > 0, b > 0 and g > 0, define the net gain from suppressing the signal s = [G,B]:




[mH(1 + V )− c] dc+
Z mj
mL




[(b+ g)mL − c] dc−
Z bmH
bmi
[(b+ g)mH − c] dc (8.5)
where
mi =
qNmM + qM(1− h∗BG)mL + qM(1− h∗GB)mH + qB(1− h∗BB)mL




qNmM + qM(1− h∗BG)mH + qM(1− h∗GB)mL + qB(1− h∗BB)mL
qN + qM(1− h∗BG) + qM(1− h∗GB) + qB(1− h∗BB)
(8.7)
Letting x ≡ mj −mL and y ≡ mH −mi, some manipulation yields:
< = (V + bg)(mLx−mHy)− 1
2
(1 + b2)(y2 + x2) (8.8)
It is straightforward to verify that x 6 y. Hence < < 0, and the principal
never suppresses the signal. ¤
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9. Appendix 2
This appendix provides some of the details that were left out of the exposition in
the main text, and referred to in footnotes (10) and (21).
(i) Section 3.1: the benchmark model
The principal’s optimal choice of communication strategy, h, given the agents’
beliefs h∗ (or equivalently r∗), is obtained by solving:
h ∈ argmax[hSWT (mL) + (1− h)SWS(mL, r∗)] (9.1)
The first-order condition for this problem (which is necessary and sufficient for
the solution) is given by:
SWT (mL)− SWS(mL, r∗) > 0; h = 1
SWT (mL)− SWS(mL, r∗) 6 0; h = 0
SWT (mL)− SWS(mL, r∗) = 0; 0 < h < 1 (9.2)
Thus, as might be expected, if the net gain from signal manipulation, equal to
SWS(mL, r
∗) − SWT (mL), is strictly positive, the principal will always suppress
the bad signal; if the net gain is strictly negative, he will always tell the truth;
finally, if the net gain is equal to zero, the principal is indifferent, and h can take
any value in the interval [0, 1].
I focus on Perfect Bayesian equilibria, which satisfy the following conditions:
h∗ ∈ argmax[hSWT (mL) + (1− h)SWS(mL, r∗)] (9.3)
r∗ =
q
q + (1− q)(1− h∗) (9.4)
(iii) Section 5: the model with heterogeneous agents
I use the following notation for uninformed beliefs: each agent believes that
s = [∅, ∅] with probability qN , s = [B,B] with probability qB, s = [B,G] with
probability qM , and s = [G,B] with probability qM , where the subscript N stands
for “no news”, the subscript B for “bad news”, and the subscript M for “mixed
news”.Given our assumptions about preferences, agent Ai will invest in his own
culture (xii = 1) if, and only if,
E[mi|sˆ] > c (9.5)
Moreover, he will invest in the other agent’s culture (xij = 1) if, and only if,
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bE[mj|sˆ] > c (9.6)
The same applies to agent Aj.
To compute the conditional expected values of mi and mj, it is again useful
to define the “reliability” of a “no news” signal, which is given by:
r∗ = Pr[s = [∅, ∅] |sˆ = [∅, ∅] ;h∗BB, h∗GB, h∗BG]
=
qN
qN + qM(1− h∗BG) + qM(1− h∗GB) + qB(1− h∗BB)
(9.7)
We shall also need the following notation:
r∗BB = Pr[s = [B,B] |sˆ = [∅, ∅] ;h∗BB, h∗GB, h∗BG] (9.8)
r∗BG = Pr[s = [B,G] |sˆ = [∅, ∅] ;h∗BB, h∗GB, h∗BG] (9.9)
r∗GB = Pr[s = [G,B] |sˆ = [∅, ∅] ;h∗BB, h∗GB, h∗BG] (9.10)
where each probability is obtained applying Bayes’ rule.
The agents’ expected value of mi conditional on each possible signal sˆ trans-
mitted by the principal is then given by:
E {mi|sˆ = [∅, ∅]} = r∗mM + r∗BBmL + r∗BGmL + r∗GBmH ≡ mi(r∗) (9.11)
E {mi|sˆ = [B,B]} = mL (9.12)
E {mi|sˆ = [B,G]} = mL (9.13)
E {mi|sˆ = [G,B]} = mH (9.14)
The expected value of mj conditional on each possible signal sˆ is similarly
given by:
E {mj|sˆ = [∅, ∅]} = r∗mM + r∗BBmL + r∗BGmH + r∗GBmL ≡ mj(r∗) (9.15)
E {mj|sˆ = [B,B]} = mL (9.16)
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E {mj|sˆ = [B,G]} = mH (9.17)
E {mj|sˆ = [G,B]} = mL (9.18)
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